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ABSTRACT
This paper’s aim is to explore the moral topics raised in 
the TV series “Star Trek: The Next Generation” Season 
2 Episode 9 entitled “Measure of Man”. In this episode 
Commander Data, an Android, is put on trial to determine 
if can be considered human, or if he has the same rights as 
a human being. This paper discusses ethical issues raised 
by this trial. Picard’s argument in defence of Data appeals 
to epistemological doubts about whether or not Data is 
sentient. But this paper will take an alternative approach. It 
will show how inanimate objects can also possess a value 
which demand ethical obligations from sentient beings. It 
will also show how the trial reflects back on human morality 
and the measure of man refers less to the audience and more 
to the human beings conducting and observing the trial.
Keywords: Star Trek, Virtue Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, 
Consequentialism, Measure of Man
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Background
Star Trek is one of the most popular science fiction franchises, 
perhaps rivalled only by Star Wars. Star Wars is classified as a space 
opera, the term used to describe a fantasy novel with space and science 
as background themes. Star Trek, on the other hand, is classified as hard 
sci-fi, a genre characterised by the attention it pays to hard questions raised 
by advanced technology, including questions that are philosophical in 
nature. There are, for instance, episodes of Star Trek that raise questions 
about morality, the mind-body problem, and artificial intelligence. 
Star Trek: The Next Generation has one of the most interesting 
characters in the series: Lieutenant Commander Data. Created by Dr. 
Noonian Soong, Data is the most sophisticated Android ever made in Star 
Fleet. He is smarter and stronger than any of his human crew members. 
With all his superior capabilities, his main responsibility is to research 
humanity. Yet his sole desire is to be more like other crew members of 
The Enterprise.
This paper focuses on the events depicted in the episode “The 
Measure of a Man”. In this episode, a trial is conducted to determine 
Data’s status in the Star Fleet. The episode begins with Commander 
Maddock, who is researching the work of Dr. Noonian Soong (the creator 
of Commander Data) in order to produce a replica of the ‘Positron Brain’ 
that gives Data his astonishing computation capability and personality. 
But Commander Maddock would need to disassemble Data in order to 
study his Positron Brain. So, he files a request to Star Fleet for Data to 
be transferred to his command. This request is approved by Star Fleet 
Command, and so Data is to be transferred to Maddock’s Command. In 
order to protect himself and the legacy of Dr. Soong, Data tries to evade 
this order by attempting to resign from Star Fleet, but his request is denied 
by the judge advocate Philippa, who accepted Maddock’s argument that 
Data is not a member of Star Fleet’s personnel, but is rather among Star 
Fleet’s property, akin to any one of its other mechanical devises, and as 
such is unable to resign from his position. Captain Jean-Luc Picard of 
the Enterprise objected to this claim. A hearing is then held to determine 
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Data’s status, with Captain Jean-Luc Picard as Data’s defence lawyer vs. 
Commander William T. Riker as the hostile attorney 
Picard’s argument in defence of Data appeals to epistemological 
doubts concerning the ability to claim that Data is not sentient. Data 
shows all the outward signs of being sentient. This casts uncertainty 
concerning whether Data is indeed, as the prosecution alleges, an insentient 
automaton. In the episode, it becomes then deeply unclear whether 
Maddock’s plan involves merely dismantling a mindless automaton - in 
order to make millions more of them, to be used as cannon fodder – or 
whether it involves destroying a conscious being in order to create and 
enslave millions more. The stakes in this case are extremely high and, 
given the seemingly intractable uncertainty, the Judge advocate errs on 
the side of caution, deeming that Data should not be dismantled or treated 
as mere property.
The question I want to raise here is this: What other considerations 
might the defence team have advanced on Data’s behalf? What if we grant 
Riker his premise that Data is an insentient machine? Does it follow that 
there is nothing morally at stake in dismantling him?
Obligations towards our property
First, let’s look at Commander Riker’s Argument, which tries to 
establish that Data is just a machine. He starts by having Data answer the 
question “What are you?”, to which Data replies that he is an android. 
Riker then proceeds to have Data demonstrate his superhuman strength by 
bending a steel bar, specify his own technical specifications, and remove 
his arm for inspection. Then, he asks who built him. Data replies “Dr. 
Noonian Soong”. Riker then press on with the question “More basic, 
what is he”. Data then answer “Human”. After that he proceed to say the 
closing line to his statement: 
The Commander is a physical representation of a dream, 
an idea conceived of by the mind of a man. Its purpose 
is to serve human needs and interests. It’s a collection of 
64   Prajñā Vihāra
neural nets and heuristic algorithms. Its responses dictated 
by an elaborate software programme written by a man. It’s 
hardware built by a man. And now. And now a man will 
shut it off. 
In a dramatic climax, he then approaches Data and presses his hidden 
off switch.
Riker’s argument can be presented as follows:
1. Commander Data is an android.
2. Android is created by a human
3. Humans are owners of their creations.
4. Therefore, Commander Data is a property of Star Fleet.
5. And therefore, they can dismantle him and study him as they 
please.
This argument is clearly flawed. We can assume that premises 1 – 
3 are true. Premise 4 raises issues relating to the concept of property – a 
category whose moral significance is questionable, since its extension is 
partly determined by legal convention.
But we can focus particularly progression from premises 1-4 to 
the conclusion 5.  This inference is entirely unwarranted. That something 
is legally and justly the property of some person or some organization 
does not give them right to do whatever they please with it. The Mona 
Lisa belongs to the Louvre, but that doesn’t give the Louvre a right to do 
whatever they please with it. The same goes for a broken tesla coil that 
Nicola Tesla himself was working on before his demise, a rare classic car, 
Light Cruiser HMS Belfast that is moored in Thames, the US Constitution 
in Boston, and even the wreckage of the USS Arizona. All of these things 
are creations of mankind and none are sentient. Yet, given their cultural 
significance, we have obligations to preserve them – or at least should not 
do any harm to them. Plausibly, the ‘should’ in these claims expresses a 
moral imperative, as opposed to (or in addition to) a legal or aesthetic one.
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It is therefore clear that some inanimate objects have a status that 
generates obligations for us to protect and preserve them. Data arguably 
falls into this category. We are granting that he is a machine, an android 
that is the property of Starfleet. The point to stress here is that it does not 
automatically follow that Starfleet has the right to dismantle and study him. 
But what if, by dismantling Data and studying him, Star Fleet can 
mass-produce androids like him. If a single Data is valuable, perhaps a 
multitude of them would be much more so. In reply, consider the USS 
Enterprise (CV-6 the World War 2 aircraft carrier), which is a ship in 
Yorktown Class, alongside CV-5 Yorktown and CV-8 Hornet. While these 
ships are identical in design, all three of them are fundamentally different. 
The name “Yorktown” refers to the great losses in Midway where many 
sailors lost their life. The name “Hornet” refers to the daring Doolittle 
Raid against the mainland of Japan. Likewise, the USS Enterprise has 
its own aura and significance.  In the episodes of The Next Generation it 
is mentioned that vessels named “Enterprise” are destined for greatness. 
While seafaring (or space) vessels often share the same class and same 
design, the meaning and value behind their name are wholly different. 
Physical identity alone does not determine the value of each object.
We have considered examples of morally and culturally significant 
artefacts that we plausibly have a moral obligation to preserve and protect. 
If Data is counted among such artefacts, we should therefore ask: what is 
it about Data that gives him this status and generates these obligations? 
Some things have value intrinsically. A person plausibly has 
intrinsic value and deserves treatment as an end in him- or herself. 
But other things have value extrinsically – value derived from their 
relationships to other things. If Data is insentient then it is plausible that 
our obligations to preserve him are due to extrinsic facts about him. There 
are two such lines of thought that I will consider: one relating Data’s 
relationship to his creator, Dr. Noonian Soong, and the other relating to 
Data’s representational properties.
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Wronging the Dead
Starfleet arguably has an obligation to protect Dr. Soong’s legacy, 
as he is now the only Soong’s Android left after his brother Lore had been 
destroyed. Data says that: 
I am the culmination of one man’s dream. This is not ego 
or vanity, but when Doctor Soong created me he added to 
the substance of the universe. If by your experiments I am 
destroyed, something unique, something wonderful will be 
lost. I cannot permit that; I must protect his dream.
Dr. Noonian Soong, Data’s creator, is dead. Does that mean that 
he cannot be wronged by destroying Data, his Magnum Opus? The action 
is wrong in the same way as peoples running around and “bombing” 
(terminology in graffiti circle which mean spraying paint over someone 
else’s work) works of the famous Thai graffiti artist Mamafaka after he 
had passed away. 
How can the dead be wronged or harmed in any way? This is a 
difficult question and I will not attempt to answer it here. What I do want 
to show, however, is that it is not at all absurd to think that the dead can 
be wronged – even if we lack an account of why this is so.
If we hold that a dead person is someone that cannot be wronged, 
why would we be obliged to posthumously execute their will? Why 
would we treat their now lifeless body with respect? Or why should we 
try to preserve their legacy? I think we can agree to a certain degree that 
there are certain actions, which when done to corpses, are distasteful or 
outright immoral. Consider the case of the infamous Count Vlad Dracula 
who impaled his political enemies and Turkish army on the iron rods. 
The impaled parties are no longer of this world and presumably do not 
know what has been done to their bodies. But this action seems distasteful 
and immoral.
Another story from Thai folklore called Sri Thanonchai. Sri 
Thanonchai is a very smart person, but cruel and used his intellect to 
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cheat other people. He made many enemies, including the king. The king 
would try to engage in a battle of wits with Sri Thanonchai but was always 
outsmarted. After Sri Thanonchai’s death, the king and his subordinates 
try to desecrate the cremated remains of Sri Thanonchai by urinating on 
them, only to get tricked by Sri Thanonchai from beyond his grave, who 
ordered his coffin and the firewood used for his funeral pyre to be made 
from nettle wood which would cause irritation to anyone exposed to its 
smoke.
Value and Representation
Some things have value because of what they represent. An 
example would be a national flag. There is nothing about the material 
composition of a flag that makes it especially valuable, nor is there 
anything intrinsically valuable about the way its colours are arranged. 
And yet many people do value their national flag and would be offended 
by somebody defacing it. They value the flag because it represents their 
nation and its history and culture. In some countries, the law states that 
the national flag cannot touch the ground. In Thailand, the law states that 
you need to respect the flag and cannot use it as a decoration. Why such 
concern over some coloured fabric? Thailand’s national flag is a symbol 
of the sovereign state and the monarchy, which have the highest value 
among Thai people. The flag is a good example of something that hold 
values extrinsic to itself. 
We can also consider an example from Star Wars. At the end of 
“Empire Strike Back,” Hans Solo was captured by The Galactic Empire. 
His body is frozen in carbonite and used as a decoration by Jabba the Hutt. 
His body is reduced to an object. Even though he is no longer sentient, we 
judge this as horribly wrong. The reason is that the value in this object is 
bestowed upon it by the human entity that it once represented. 
Likewise, Data is a representation of human being. He is made 
in the image of man. The whole gamut of good human characteristics is 
encoded inside him: curiosity, compassion, intellectual and many more, 
even if he (might not) be conscious.
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Virtue-ethics considerations
The final line of thought that I will consider takes a cue from virtue 
ethics. What would a virtuous person do in this scenario? What kind of 
a person would want to dismantle Data? More directly, what kind of a 
person is Maddock?
Commander Maddock is what we can call a “flat-character”. He is 
represented as being somewhat malicious. He is the very definition of a 
mad scientist. To Maddock, morality is just an impediment to the pursuit 
of scientific breakthroughs. He is not completely lacking in morality. He 
merely places morality in lesser priority. 
Data is an important crew of the Enterprise, the most esteemed 
vessel of Starfleet. Data is an engineering marvel created by the great 
mind. And given his complex history and existence – not to mention to 
significant chance that he is indeed sentient – a virtuous person would 
not treat him as a replaceable machine. 
One counterargument aims to justify Maddock’s proposal in 
consequentialist terms. Perhaps there have been unethical experiments 
in human history that have led to huge breakthroughs in science. But this 
observation does more to refute consequentialism than it does to justify 
the experiments. While the result of these experiments seem to justify 
them, they are still cruel and unethical.
Conclusion
We can conclude that evidence and argument raised by Riker 
is inconclusive. Even if Data is insentient, this is not enough to justify 
Maddock’s proposal. But this trial can serve us as a way to learn more 
about ourselves. In Star Trek: Nemesis, Data met his demise during the 
Borg invasion. And in his memory Picard says to B-4, Data’s brother: 
I don’t know if all this has made any sense. I wanted you to 
know what kind of man he was. In his quest to be more like 
us ...he helped us to see what it means to be human.” “My 
brother was not human” replied B-4. “No, he wasn’t. But 
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his wonder, his curiosity about every facet of human nature 
...allowed all of us to see the best parts of ourselves. He 
evolved. He embraced change because he always wanted 
to be better than he was.
In the end, Data is perhaps the most humane character in the entire 
series. He naïvely embraces every side of humanity. He reflected a picture 
of humanity in the purest and most innocent ways. 
The name of the episode “Measure of Man” is ambiguous. Who 
is being measured in this episode exactly? Is it Data being measured for 
whether or not he is a “man”? Was Maddock measured for his lack of 
ethical virtue? Or is it we, the audience, who are being asked to reflect 
and measure our own value? 
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